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Abstract This paper utilizes establishment-level data to explore the impact of works
councils on firm productivity in France. A variety of empirical techniques is
employed, including fixed effects and regression discontinuity designs, to identify
this impact. We estimate the works council effect on productivity in union and
nonunion settings, and investigate the extent to which alternative forms of worker
voice and information sharing might substitute for the works council’s impact in
production. We find no evidence of a positive impact of works councils on firm
productivity in any of our results, and some limited evidence of a negative effect in
some of the findings. There is no indication that estimated impacts on productivity
vary with union status. However, a notable finding is that worker voice and
information-sharing human resource practices are prevalent in French firms
regardless of works council status, and are found to have positive and statistically
significant effects on firm productivity.
Keywords Works council . Productivity .Worker voice
JEL Classification J53 . J58 . J51
Introduction
Works councils are an enduring feature of industrial relations in continental Europe,
encouraging labor-management cooperation through the joint sharing of information,
consultation, and, in some cases, co-determination regarding important firm
decisions such as workplace health and safety and overtime work. With the
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European Directive on Information and Consultation, which mandated consultative
mechanisms throughout EU workplaces beginning in 2008, the impact of works
councils are of growing interest in European countries. However, empirical evidence
on the impact of works councils on industrial relations and firm performance is
largely limited to the case of Germany.1 In this paper we present the first empirical
evidence of which we are aware on the impact of works councils on firm
productivity in France.
The French case is an interesting contrast to the German one. French works
councils are much less aligned with trade unions, they possess no statutory co-
determination rights, and they are mandated for firms above fifty workers as
opposed to firms above five. Exploring the productivity impact of works councils in
union and nonunion settings is thus easier in the French than in the German case
because the two forms of worker representation are less co-mingled in the former.
The higher worker threshold before works councils are mandated by law affords our
analysis a healthier proportion of firms without works councils and thereby allows a
meaningful opportunity to employ a regression discontinuity research design in
exploring the works council impact on productivity.
In addition, and in contrast to much of the German analyses, our data contain a
good measure of the capital stock of firms, which is crucial to the estimation of
production functions. The French data we employ are relatively short of
establishment-level control variables, but our fixed effects estimation strategy serves
to partially overcome this drawback. We possess good measures of both union status
and establishment workplace practices that allow for an exploration of the extent to
which informal mechanisms for worker voice and information-sharing may
substitute for works councils in productivity outcomes in France.
The results of our analysis are mixed. We find no evidence of a positive impact of
French works councils on firm productivity, and in fact some limited results
suggesting a negative impact on productivity. Union status appears to have no
influence whatsoever on the estimated productivity impact of works councils.
However, human resource practices associated with worker voice and information
sharing—features commonly associated with works councils—are widespread in
French firms and, according to our findings, have a positive and statistically
significant impact on firm productivity.
Theory and Empirical Evidence on Works Councils and Productivity
Theory suggests that works councils may enhance firm productivity in a variety of
ways:2 They may provide a forum in which workers share valuable knowledge of
production with management or in which discussions between labor and manage-
ment per se yield useful ideas for productivity improvements (Freeman and Lazear
1995). Firms with works councils may also be more productive because they are
1 The Kleiner and Lee (1997) study using data on South Korea, which reveals a positive and statistically
significant impact of works council on productivity in that country, is an important exception.
2 A new book by Addison (2010) offers an exhaustive treatment of both the theory behind works council
impacts in production and the empirical evidence to date on these impacts in the German case.
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more successful in overcoming the negative consequences—retaliatory worker shirking
or suboptimal worker investment in firm-specific training—typically associated with
the employer “hold-up” problem. In long-term relationships with incomplete contract-
ing, firms have an incentive to reduce wages and benefits in an attempt to appropriate
worker quasi-rents by falsely claiming economic distress in the firm. Works councils
may act as credible mechanisms for verifying the economic status of the firm to the
workforce, and thereby prevent this opportunistic behavior by employers and the
negative outcomes for productivity that may flow from it (see Addison 2010).
Theory suggests that works councils may also have a negative effect on firm
productivity. To the extent knowledge of and involvement in the production process
leads to worker empowerment, works councils may become appropriative agencies
in production in much the same way as firms with sole managerial prerogative are
viewed in the hold-up problem described above. This is acknowledged even by those
who are inclined towards a sympathetic view of the productivity-enhancing effects
of works councils in production (see, for example, Freeman and Lazear 1995).
It is also possible that works councils reduce firm productivity even as they
enhance the joint surplus from production, once one accepts the position that the
joint surplus includes workplace features such as worker health and safety or a
moderate work pace which workers value and yet which may compromise
productivity. If the combination of wages and working conditions as determined
by market forces is allocatively suboptimal, works council voice may lead to an
alteration of the overall compensation package—a lowering of wages, for example,
in exchange for improvements in working conditions—in such a way that lowers
firm productivity at the same time that it enhances the joint surplus from
production.3 In this view, productivity, which is a barometer for the wages of
workers and the profits of firms, is not an accurate indicator of the joint surplus from
production because workers also care about working conditions, improvement in
which may require that productivity be compromised (Fairris 2002).
When considering the impact of works councils in production, it must be noted
that this particular form of worker voice may be neither necessary nor sufficient for
the various enhancements in firm productivity with which it is sometimes associated.
Works councils may be unnecessary if similar productivity enhancements can be
generated via informal worker voice mechanisms and information-sharing arrange-
ments outside of formal works council structures.
Informal mechanisms for worker voice and information sharing have grown
rapidly across the globe in recent decades following evidence that Japanese
production methods which possess such arrangements—e.g., quality circles and
teams in production—generate high levels of firm productivity. France was among
the many countries to experiment with informal voice and information sharing
arrangements beginning in the 1970s and 1980s (Jenkins 2000). The spread of such
arrangements may have reduced the importance of works councils as generators of
mutually advantageous changes in production that lead to increased productivity.
Information sharing with employees, even in the absence of a worker-based
collective entity to verify this information, may reduce the hold-up problem referred
3 Theory tells us, for example, that collectively-experienced working conditions outcomes will reflect the
preferences of the marginal rather than the median worker when determined by market forces.
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to above. Allowing workers some decision making or voice in production, even
though it operates outside the formal and collectivist confines of the works council,
may also lead to productivity enhancements.
In addition to being unnecessary, works councils may be insufficient to generate
the productivity gains with which they are sometimes associated if they lack the
power to ensure that workers share in the rewards from adjustments in production
that yield a productivity increase. Workers are unlikely to make suggestions that
increase the joint surplus if their implementation would alter the distribution of
rewards from production in management’s favor. Thus, there may be a natural limit
to the effectiveness of works councils unless workers possess some distributive
power in production in addition to pure collaboration and consultation rights.
Works councils in France are not very powerful. Compared to their German
counterparts, French works councils lack state-sanctioned co-determination rights that
grant labor virtual parity with management in decision-making over a range of
production decisions that affect workers. However, co-determination rights are not the
only way to endow works councils with the power to ensure that workers share in the
rewards from efficiency-enhancing changes in production. Independent unions may
serve as an equally effective force for labor in this regard.4 Works councils and unions
may therefore be complementary forces in the enhancement of firm productivity.
The empirical literature on the impact of works councils on firm productivity is
largely restricted to the German case. Addison (2010) offers a comprehensive review
of the existing literature. The early literature, which was plagued by small sample
sizes and industry or regional specificity, was generally not supportive of a positive
impact of works councils on firm productivity. Addison divides the more modern
literature, which makes use of larger-scale data sets, into two phases. The first offers
a significantly more positive view of the works council effect on productivity, in
some part because of the introduction of new variables—such as collective
bargaining, employee involvement, and establishment size—into the analysis. An
illustrative paper is Addison et al. (2001), who find a positive productivity effect of
works councils except in smaller size (21–100 worker) plants.
The third phase of research on the productivity impact of works councils in
Germany is characterized by the use of panel data, allowing for fixed effects
estimation, and the use of more sophisticated econometrics techniques, such as
propensity score matching and selection modeling. In almost every case, the
empirical findings are much more mixed than in the second phase of research, with
some studies finding a positive and statistically significant impact of works councils
on productivity but a majority indicating no statistically significant effect. Addison
et al. (2006) offer an interesting contrast between the second and third phases of this
research. After establishing a strongly positive and statistically significant impact of
works councils on productivity in their pooled panel data (except, once again, for
plants with 21–100 employees), the authors’ fixed effects estimates using these same
data contain little evidence of a positive works council effect on productivity.
4 This point was made by Paul Douglas (1921), who argued that the works council-like shop committees
of the 1920s in the US were complements to and not, as commonly viewed by labor and management at
the time, substitutes for independent trades unions in increasing the overall benefits to labor and capital in
production. In Douglas’ view shop committees cooperated with management to generate productive
efficiency and unions ensured that workers shared in the rewards that followed.
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There is a small number of studies in the German case with evidence on whether
alternative forms of worker voice and information sharing may act as substitutes for
(or perhaps even complements to) works councils in production. One group of
studies merely focuses on the extent to which they coexist. Addison et al. (1997)
find that the incidence of teamwork is much lower in works council settings—
suggestive of a substitute relation—whereas Gerlach and Jirjahn (2001) find that
group incentive schemes are more prevalent in firms with works councils—
suggestive of a complementary relation between the two.
There are only two studies that explore specifically the joint impact of works
councils and alternative voice forms on productivity: Zwick (2004), who finds that
works councils bolster the impact of employee involvement schemes on productivity,
and Hubler and Jirjahn (2002), who find mixed results, one suggesting a positive
impact on productivity where works councils coexist with teams in production and
another suggesting a negative impact where they coexist with a reduction in
hierarchical decision making in production. Interestingly, Zwick (2004) finds a
positive impact of employee involvement schemes solely in settings where they
coexist with works councils.
Only a handful of papers in the German literature explore specifically the
potential complimentary relation between works councils and unions, but most find
a positive works council impact on productivity in establishments (and sometimes
exclusively in such establishments) where there exist collective bargaining agree-
ments (Hubler and Jirjahn 2003; Wagner 2008). This is consistent with the Freeman
and Lazear and Douglas view of industrial relations systems, where worker voice
and worker empowerment join forces to generate positive effects for both workers
and firms.
Works Councils and Unions in France
French law grants workers rights of participation in the affairs of firms according to
the size of the establishment or firm. There are two main forms of statutory non-
union representation in France.
The first is the workforce delegate (délégué du personnel or DP). A workforce
delegate is required by law in all firms or establishments with ten or more
employees, regardless of union status. A workforce delegate is elected for a 2-year
term by the employees, and the delegate’s role consists in presenting individual and
collective grievances to management. The delegate is also responsible for conveying
to government inspectors complaints in connection with the possible violation of
labor regulations. This is the most widespread form of non-union employee
representation in France, but the powers and responsibilities of workforce delegates
are limited in comparison with those of a second form of non-union worker
representation—namely, works councils.
Works councils (Comités d’Entreprise) have been a compulsory form of worker
representation since 1945 in French firms with over 50 employees. The works
council in France is a collective body composed of worker representatives who are
elected by the workforce. The minimum number of elected representatives is fixed
by the government according to the size of the establishment (e.g. three
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representatives in establishments with 50 to 74 workers). Prior to 2005, works
council representatives were elected every 2 years; currently, they stand for 4 year
terms. Participation in the election of works council representatives is consistently
above 60%, making them bodies that are highly representative of the workforce as a
whole. The head of the firm or establishment chairs the works council.
While works councils are mandated by law in establishments of over 50 workers,
if too few candidates emerge for representative positions, no works council may
exist. Also, if works council representatives leave or retire and no replacements
emerge, the works council may be disbanded. Occasionally employers may put
pressure on potential candidates not to run for works council positions in hopes of
thereby avoiding works councils in the firm. However, this behaviour is uncommon
and predominately found in service sector firms. Works councils are also observed in
establishments below the 50-worker threshold, when for example an employer
organizes works council elections in order to improve the dialogue between labor
and management inside the firm.
The works council has consultative powers in regard to all significant employer
initiatives concerning the organization and management of the firm, including for
example collective layoffs and technological changes. The employer has to inform
the works council before initiating any such changes and the work council
representatives may poll the workforce for advice on the changes. The employer
also has to provide the works council with information on the financial situation of
the firm. While the works council possesses little formal bargaining power or rights
of co-determination in such matters, in practice numerous agreements, both formal
and informal, are concluded between the head of an enterprise and the works
council, and the labor courts may accord these agreements a legal force. The works
council is typically granted full control over company welfare and cultural facilities.
Whereas works councils are the main body fostering collective discussions
between labor and management, it is unions—and their representatives in the form
of the Union delegates (Délégués syndicaux or DS)—that possess the bargaining
power for workers. Since the Auroux’ laws in 1982, unions and representative
bodies of workers such as works councils may coexist in French firms, under the
principle that unions bargain with the employer while works councils foster a
sharing of information that leads to mutually beneficial outcomes.
Union delegates are generally not elected. Every representative union which has
members in a firm with more than 50 employees is entitled to a trade union delegate.
In firms with fewer than 50 employees, an elected workforce delegate may be
appointed to act simultaneously as a union delegate. Union delegates represent their
trade union in bargaining with the head of the firm, but have the task of protecting
the interests both of the union members and of the workforce as a whole. The
employer has to bargain each year with union delegates on wages, hours of work,
and working conditions. The agreements have legal force and they apply to all
workers even if they are not union members.
In unionized establishments, union members may assume the roles of workforce
delegates, works council representatives, and union delegates. In firms with union
delegates, these delegates participate in the works council, but they do not vote if
they are not elected as works council representatives. In this way, concerns of
workers raised through works council discussions may become bargaining demands
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in union negotiations. As our data indicate, worker representation through works
councils is more widespread in France than representation through unions.
Data
This paper relies on two datasets—REPONSE and Diane—which are merged to
conduct the analysis of the works council impact on firm productivity. REPONSE
(RElations PrOfessionnelles et NégociationS d’Entreprise) is a survey of establish-
ments conducted jointly by the French Ministry of Labor and the National Institute of
Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). Taking roughly 1 hour on average to
complete, senior managers answer survey questions in face-to-face interviews with
survey enumerators. REPONSE is gathered primarily to provide consistent information
to the government on labor relations—including workforce representation, conflicts,
and collective bargaining—and on the internal organization and recent technological
changes in production. The REPONSE data has been used extensively in economics
research (see, for example, Caroli and Van Reenen 2001; Askenazy et al. 2006).
We utilize the 1999 and 2005 REPONSE surveys for the analysis in this paper.
These are separate cross-sectional establishment surveys, including more than 2,500
establishments during each administration with a response rate averaging a
respectable 60% over both administrations. The sample is a random selection from
the exhaustive INSEE establishment records, excluding agriculture and public-sector
enterprises, and is stratified by establishment size. The years 1999 to 2005 are a
particularly relevant period for our study in that this period witnessed significant
changes in both works council status and union coverage corresponding with
implementation of the 35-hour workweek.
We utilize the REPONSE surveys to record works council status, union status,
and a variety of other establishment-level measures including worker voice and
information sharing features. The “works council” and “union” variables account for
whether or not there is a works council or union bargaining agent present in the firm.
The works council variable simply asks if there is a works council present, whereas
the union variable asks if there is a “union delegate” in the firm. As noted above,
union delegates are the legal representatives of unions in French firms; employers
are compelled by labor law to bargain with union delegates at least once a year over
wages, hours of work, and working conditions.
“Employee decision making” is a measure of worker voice in the firm, and
specifically the autonomy workers possess in production in resolving difficulties
without having to consult or receive approval from management. “Information to
employees” captures the extent to which firms inform employees regarding such
matters as technological and organizational changes, firm strategy, economic
performance, and even the environmental impact of the firm. The REPONSE data
possess a major limitation in comparison with some of the German data in that they
contain fewer establishment-level control variables for use in the regression analysis.
We estimate a fixed effects model of firm productivity to address this limitation, but,
as we shall see, the fixed effects estimation itself has certain limitations.
The second dataset—Diane (diane.bvdep.com)—is at the firm, as opposed to
establishment, level and comes from a private source. Diane compiles public balance
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sheets that firms must provide to the commercial courts (i.e., greffes des tribunaux de
commerce). The database is not entirely exhaustive because firms may choose to
keep secret their corporate information and incur a fine as a consequence. Diane
contains various statistics on firm balances including value-added and sales, as well
as workforce size.5 It also gives the complete yearly fiscal sheets (i.e., liasse fiscale).
The advantage of these fiscal sheets is that we can compute estimates of the capital
stock for individual firms. There exists a variety of methods to derive such estimates
from these data, but the literature generally prefers a measure of the gross capital
stock at current cost (OECD 2001). This estimate is derived using the following
formula:
Gross capital stock at current cost ¼ Gross capital stock at historical cost
 1þ average inflation rate of investmentð
 average age of capital stockÞ:
The inflation rate of investment is given by INSEE (about 2% for studied firms),
and the average age of capital is assessed at 27 years for buildings and 9 years for
equipment. The balance sheets provide directly the gross capital stock at historical
cost—a less sophisticated measure which is nonetheless strongly correlated with the
value at current cost that we use here, even after correcting for the size effect.
Although Diane provides the annual average size of the firm workforce, it contains
no information on actual hours worked; thus, in this analysis labor input is measured
in terms of the number of workers as opposed to the number of worker hours.
These two data sets were merged based on firm identifiers. Because we lack
works council information for every establishment in multi-establishment firms, and
productivity information at the individual establishment level, our analysis in this
paper is restricted to single-establishment firms. This is obviously a non-
representative sample of firms in France,6 but it has the virtue of directly relating
works council status of an individual productive unit to the productivity level of that
unit. In multi-establishment firms, works councils may exist at the firm level as well
as at each establishment level. However, the existence of a firm-level works council
is a questionable measure to use in estimating the works council impact on
productivity, which is best estimated with information on works council status and
productivity at the level of the productive unit—i.e., the establishment.
After merging the two data sets and omitting those with missing observations on
key variables, there are a total of 1008 single establishment firms for analysis over
the two periods. Because we possess firm identifiers, it is possible to create a panel
data set composed of those firms that appear in both survey years; there are 109 such
firms, composing 218 of the 1008 observations in the combined cross-sectional data.
We refer to the larger data set as the “pooled” data and to the smaller data set as the
“panel” data. Table 1 gives the variable definitions and Table 2, the descriptive
5 All balance variables are in constant euros.
6 Even compared to all single establishment firms in France, these data are slightly unrepresentative in that
they are restricted to firms with twenty or more workers. Compared to the larger INSEE establishment file
for single establishment firms, we find that sectors with smaller size firms (e.g., retail trade, finance and
real estate, and personal services) are slightly underrepresented in our data, whereas sectors with larger
establishments (e.g., consumption goods, equipment goods, and intermediate goods) are overrepresented.
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statistics. Table 2 reveals that, for the pooled data, the density of unions, works
councils, and firms with employee decision making declined over the period 1998 to
2004, whereas information sharing arrangements witnessed an increase. These changes
are generally tempered somewhat in the panel data, and in the case of works councils
the direction of change is reversed—works council density rises in this sample.
Empirical Methodology
Our strategy is to estimate total factor productivity regressions, where the dependent
variable is the residual from a simple log-in-log production function of the following
form:
VAit ¼ 80 þ 81workforceit þ 82capitalit þ eit; ð1Þ
where VAit is value added in production.
We invoke a variety of identification strategies to estimate the causal impact of
works councils on total factor productivity, each of which is mindful of the fact that
while the pooled data are formed from two independent surveys of establishments,
they nonetheless contain a subset of firms with two observations at separate points in
time.7 The basic specification is as follows:
TFPit ¼ a0 þ a1wcit þ a2unionit þ a3voiceit þ a4infoit þ a5timeþ a6Iit þ eit; ð2Þ
where TFP is the residual from estimation of Eq. 1 above, voice is the employee
decision making variable, info is the information to employees variable, I is a vector
of industry categorical variables, wc represents the works council variable, and the
Table 1 Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Value Added Valued Added (in millions of constant Euros)
Capital Estimated Capital Stock (in thousands of constant Euros)
Workforce Number of Employees
Workforce50 = 1 If Workforce is Greater Than or Equal to 50; 0 Otherwise
Works Council = 1 If there is a Works Council Present in the Firm; 0 Otherwise
Union = 1 If there is a Union Delegate Present in the Firm; 0 Otherwise
Employee Decision Making = 1 If Firm Encourages Employee Decision-Making in Case of a
Difficulty or Incident in Production; 0 If Employees Must First
Consult with Management
Information to Employees = 1 If Firm Regularly Disseminates Information About the Firm’s
Performance to Workers; 0 If Sometimes/Never
Time = 1 If 2008; 0 Otherwise
Industry 11 Industry Categorical Variables
7 A Chow test failed to reject the null hypothesis of no structural differences across separate 1998 and
2004 productivity regressions, suggesting that it is acceptable to pool the data and estimate a single
productivity regression with a time dummy to capture the inter-temporal nature of the data.
J Labor Res (2010) 31:209–229 217
remainder—union and time—are clearly defined. Our interest is in the estimated
coefficient α1 which represents the works council impact on total factor productivity.
In addition to this basic specification, we estimate an equation which contains
terms that allow for interactive effects between works councils and unions, voice,
and information sharing variables—wc* union, wc* voice and wc* info. If the works
council impact on productivity is bolstered by the presence of a union, the
coefficient on the interaction term wc* union will be positive. A strong indication
that informal voice and information sharing arrangements are substitutes for works
councils in generating productivity impacts is signaled by estimated coefficients on
the stand-alone voice and information sharing variables—voice and info—that are
positive and of greater combined quantitative magnitude than the works council
effect—the sum of the coefficient on the stand alone works council variable, wc, and
the coefficients on the interaction terms wc* voice and wc* info, with the latter two
properly weighted by the density of voice and information sharing arrangements in
works council settings, respectively. Negative estimated coefficients on the
interaction terms are a weaker indication of substitutability.
We begin with a simple OLS estimation procedure with random effects to account
for the fact that a subset of the sample is repeated observations on the same
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variables Cross sections and pooled Panel









Valued Added 16761 23693 20681 2001 2344 2194 14220 16678 15449
(4538) (3473) (2783) (118) (126) (88) (2563) (2643) (1839)
Capital 24665 45350 36362 3267 3990 3674 21095 23815 22455
(4289) (10334) (6140) (1203) (1205) (857) (4313) (3876) (2894)
Workforce 232 356 302 47 44 45 262 289 275
(24) (63) (37) (1) (1) (1) (43) (45) (31)
Workforce50 0.737 0.684 0.707 0.390 0.250 0.311 0.798 0.826 0.812
(0.021) (0.019) (0.014) (0.045) (0.035) (0.028) (0.039) (0.037) (0.027)
Works Council 0.719 0.675 0.694 0.432 0.243 0.326 0.780 0.789 0.784
(0.021) (0.020) (0.015) (0.046) (0.035) (0.029) (0.040) (0.039) (0.028)
Union 0.553 0.539 0.545 0.339 0.184 0.252 0.651 0.642 0.647
(0.024) (0.021) (0.016) (0.044) (0.032) (0.026) (0.046) (0.046) (0.032)
Employee Decision
Making
0.712 0.542 0.616 0.754 0.520 0.622 0.688 0.532 0.610
(0.022) (0.021) (0.015) (0.040) (0.041) (0.030) (0.045) (0.048) (0.033)
Information to
Employees
0.527 0.600 0.568 0.466 0.493 0.481 0.569 0.651 0.610
(0.024) (0.021) (0.016) (0.046) (0.041) (0.030) (0.048) (0.046) (0.033)
Observations 438 570 1008 118 152 270 109 109 218
Standard errors in parentheses.
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establishments. A concern with this specification procedure is that unobserved firm
heterogeneity may prevent us from identifying the true causal impact of works
councils on productivity. We begin to address concerns of this sort by estimating a
fixed effects model which utilizes the panel aspect of the data to control for time-
invariant unobserved firm features.
Fixed-effects estimation identifies the productivity impact of works councils
based on the change in productivity taking place at firms that undergo a change in
works council status over the period 1998 to 2004. Time invariant features of firms
are thus controlled for in the fixed effects estimates. With this procedure, one must
be assured that there exists an adequate number of changers, that measurement error
in the works council variable is not exacerbated by virtue of the focus on changers,
and that changers are a random draw from the larger set of establishments. Each is a
challenge in our analysis.
Regarding the number of changers, only 11 of the 109 panel of establishments
changed works council status over the period (6 acquiring and 5 abandoning), 11
changed union status (5 acquiring and 6 abandoning), 43 changed employee decision
making status (13 acquiring and 30 abandoning), and 49 changed information
sharing status (26 acquiring and 23 abandoning). Because we are also interested in
the interaction terms in this analysis, it is important to note that works councils
changed status quite independently of the other variables—of the 11 firms changing
works council status, 9, 5, and 7 did so without changing union, employee decision
making, and information sharing status, respectively. These are uncomfortably small
numbers on which to estimate the works council impact on productivity, but as part
of a larger set of findings the results are illustrative.
The error with which a variable is measured may be exacerbated when the focus is
on changers, and especially so when (as is true in this case) the variable of interest
changes very little over time. Measurement error leads to estimated effects that are
biased towards zero.8 Non-random selection into and out of works council status over
this period is also a potential problem for the fixed effects analysis. For example, it
seems reasonable to expect that establishments adopting works councils are likely to
be those that benefit the most from their presence, while those abandoning works
councils receive the least benefit (or even a loss) due to their presence.
Because of these concerns with the fixed effects specification, we invoke an
alternative identification strategy—a regression discontinuity design—which utilizes
a different procedure to address bias due to unobserved heterogeneity. The basic
thrust behind the regression discontinuity approach is to identify an exogenous
“sorting” mechanism—in our case, something that exogenously sorts firms into and
out of works council status—and then to compare the outcome variable of interest—
in our case, total factor productivity—across the observations that are just on the
cusp of being sorted into and out of the category of interest.
The premise, which can be subjected to limited empirical investigation, is that
observations just on the cusp of the sorting mechanism cutoff criterion are likely to be
very similar with respect to both observed and unobserved characteristics. Moreover,
8 Six of the eleven establishments witnessing a change in works council status over the period also crossed
the 50-worker threshold in doing so—an indication that, for these firms at least, the recorded change in
status is not due to measurement error.
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because the sorting mechanism is exogenous, the assignment of a works council to
these establishments is likely to be a purely random event, thereby tackling the
problem of unobserved heterogeneity due to self selection. In a valid regression
discontinuity design, any difference in the outcome variable across the “treated” and
“control” groups is truly causally related to the “treatment.” In our case, possessing a
works council is the treatment, the sorting mechanism that places firms into the
“treated” and “control” groups is the French legal mandate that firms with 50 or more
workers must possess a works council, and the outcome is productivity.
The basic econometric framework for regression discontinuity involves replacing
the variable of causal interest in the outcome regression with (1) a dichotomous
variable indicating whether the cutoff point for sorting into the “treated” status has
been reached and (2) a (typically nonlinear) functional relationship composed of the
values on the sorting criterion itself, which allows the estimated coefficient on the
dichotomous cutoff variable to capture the difference in the dependent variable for
observations in a narrow band around the cutoff criterion. The coefficient on the
dichotomous cutoff variable is taken to be an estimate of the true causal impact.9
This approach is valid if the sorting criterion is sharp—that is, if those
establishments in our sample that meet or exceed the cutoff criterion are assigned
works councils and those below the cutoff are not. However, in our case the “50 or
greater” cutoff criterion is not decisive (see Table 3): there are firms in our data with
fewer than 50 workers that nonetheless possess works councils (32 of 295) and firms
with 50 or more workers that do not possess works councils (45 of 713). Thus, there
is endogenous, voluntary adoption below the sorting criterion and noncompliance at
or above it. Under these circumstances, a “fuzzy” regression discontinuity technique
is appropriate. This approach mimics the basic regression discontinuity design, but
takes into account the “fuzziness” of the sorting criterion by using the dichotomous
cutoff variable as an “identifying” variable in a first-stage regression equation that
models works council status, thereby allowing for the creation of an instrumental
variable for works council status that is used in the total factor productivity
regressions (Imbens and Angrist 1994). It is the coefficient on the instrumented
works council variable that is the estimate of the true causal impact of works
councils on productivity in this design.
The empirical methodology is as follows:
wcit ¼ q0 þ q1workforce50it þ q2w workforceitð Þ þ q3unionit þ q4voiceit
þ q5infoit þ q6timeþ q7Iit þ ς it ð3Þ
is the first-stage, instrumenting equation which is used to derive the instrumental
variable wc* which is then used in a total factor productivity regression of the
following form:
TFPit ¼ b0 þ b1wc»it þ b2w workforceitð Þ þ b3unionit þ b4voiceit þ b5infoit
þ b6timeþ b7Iit þ uit ð4Þ
9 See Imbens and Lemieux (2008) for a review of econometrics issues surrounding the regression
discontinuity design.
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Workforce50 is the dichotomous cutoff variable, and w(workforce) is a linear
combination of the workforce variable in linear, quadratic and cubic form. This
nonlinear relationship of the sorting criterion forces a comparison of productivity for
the “treated” (i.e., establishments with works councils) and “control” (i.e.,
establishments without works councils) groups within a narrow band around the
cutoff itself. The coefficient β1 represents an estimate of the true causal impact of
works councils on total factor productivity.10
As a check on the full regression results, it is common in the literature to estimate
Eqs. 2 and 3 using a smaller sample, one that represents a narrow band around the
cutoff criterion. We do this for the sample of establishments with workforce size
between 30 and 70, inclusive. (See Table 2 for descriptive statistics on this sample.)
We may also utilize this sample to test for similarity in the values of establishment
covariates across the “treated” and “control” populations. A comparison of means on
the various control variables across the 30–49 and 50–70 samples reveals no
statistically significant differences with the exception of union status, which is
significantly larger for the sample of firms with workforce size between 50 and 70,
inclusive.
A clear advantage of the regression discontinuity design over the fixed effects
specification is that the estimated works council impact on productivity from the
former estimation procedure is based on a larger number of observations—1008
versus 218. (Twenty of these observations come from 10 of the 11 firms that
changed works council status over the two periods.) Even the smaller sample, with
Table 3 Distribution of workforce by works council status
Worforce Works council Total
No Yes
< 49 263 32 295
≥ 50–100 26 151 177
100–200 11 204 215
200–300 2 105 107
300–400 2 29 31
400–500 1 44 45
500–600 0 28 28
600–700 0 22 22
700–800 0 15 15
800–900 0 14 14
900–1,000 0 11 11
≥ 1,000 3 45 48
Total 308 700 1008
10 In the interactive specifications the interactive terms are generated in the following manner: wc** union,
wc** voice and wc** info.
J Labor Res (2010) 31:209–229 221
firms in the 30–70 workforce range, contains 270 observations. While the regression
discontinuity design is superior in this respect, it is not without possible flaws.
For example, although noncompliance with the mandate appears to be an option
for establishments above the cutoff criterion, some firms may be uncomfortable with
this form of works council avoidance. One possible alternative route is to
strategically keep employment below 50 in order to avoid triggering the onset of a
works council. As a way of testing for this form of manipulation (and possible bias
in the regression discontinuity results), McCrary (2008) suggests exploring the
number of establishments in equally-sized bins around the cutoff criterion to see if
there is inordinate clustering—in this case, below the threshold. There are 28 firms
in the 46–48 range and 22 firms in the 52–54 range. Widening the ranges a bit, there
are 76 firms in the 40–48 range and 43 firms in the 52–60 range. Although perhaps
not alarmingly different, the distribution of firms is clearly not uniform in a range
around the 50 worker threshold. This is something to bear in mind as we turn to the
results.
Results
Table 4 gives the results of the total factor productivity regressions invoking random
and fixed effects. Column (1) gives the log-in-log production function estimation
results, the residuals from which form the values of the dependent variable in the
total factor productivity regression results in the remaining columns.11 Turning, first,
to the random effects results in column (2), we see that, although positive, the works
council impact on productivity is quantitatively very small and not statistically
significant. In fact, except for the linear time trend—indicating a roughly 12%
increase in total factor productivity over the period 1998–2004—the only variables
of any significance statistically are the voice and information sharing variables.
Granting employees a decision making voice in production and sharing pertinent
information with them yield an 8% and 6% bump in productivity, respectively.
Is there any indication that unions promote superior works council impacts on
productivity, or that voice and information sharing arrangements lead to significant
productivity impacts in non-works council settings? For evidence on these, we turn
to the interactive results in column (3). The first thing to note about these findings is
that the data are not entirely up to the task of separating out the various sought after
effects; none of either the stand alone or interactive variables is statistically
significantly different from zero. Ignoring the imprecision of the estimated impacts,
however, we are forced to conclude that there is virtually no support for the view
that productivity outcomes are superior for works councils when they are
11 The column (1) results can be thought of as estimates from a Cobb-Douglas production function with
the coefficients on the labor and capital variables representing the labor and capital share in value added,
respectively. Dating back to the seminal work of Douglas and his co-authors (e.g., Bronfenbrenner and
Douglas 1939), the estimated value of labor’s share in total output has historically been in the range of
0.75. Our estimates in this paper range from 0.8 to 0.9, but these are derived from a value added (as
opposed to output) equation and for single-establishment firms (as opposed to all firms), and as a result
might be expected to be even higher than average. Our results are thus consistent with the literature.
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accompanied by a union presence in the firm—the wc* union interactive variable is
negative in magnitude.
The results also suggest that, while firms without works councils represent only
about one-third of the sample, the impact of worker voice and information sharing
arrangements is quantitatively sizeable in these establishments. Granting to
employees decision making responsibility and sharing certain information with
them leads to a 7% and 4% impact on productivity, respectively, in establishments
without works councils. This compares with a 2% and 3% impact in works council
settings, respectively. If we add to this the rather meager 1% impact on productivity
of other features associated with works councils (as indicated by the estimated
coefficient on the stand alone works council variable), the results offer suggestive
evidence that worker-friendly human resource practices existing outside of formal
works council settings may be suitable substitutes for the activities of works councils
Table 4 Total factor productivity regressions with random and fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)





Works Council 0.002 0.008 −0.034 −0.023
(0.041) (0.065) (0.103) (0.121)
Union −0.05 0.058 −0.095 −0.022
(0.039) (0.088) (0.097) (0.198)
Employee Decision Making 0.081* 0.072 −0.027 −0.044
(0.031) (0.054) (0.052) (0.103)
Information to Employees 0.061** 0.042 0.07 0.113
(0.030) (0.054) (0.050) (0.123)
Works Council*Union −0.134 −0.111
(0.097) (0.229)
Works Council*Employee 0.016 0.014
(0.065) (0.122)
Works Council*Information 0.025 −0.059
(0.065) (0.136)
Time 0.117* 0.118* 0.083** 0.088*
(0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.033)
Industry Controls √ √ √ √
Constant 10.042* −0.216** −0.210** 0.098 0.123
(0.079) (0.087) (0.094) (0.126) (0.138)
Observations 1008 1008 1008 218 218
Standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%
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when it comes to mechanisms for fostering productivity improvement. In fact, it is
perhaps for this reason that the incidence of such features in non-works council
settings—59% of these firms encourage employee decision making and 45% share
information with workers—is almost as large as among firms with works councils
(at 63% and 62%, respectively).
Columns (4) and (5) reproduce the above specifications but employ a fixed effects
estimation procedure. This reduces the meaningful sample to 218, or 109 firms and
only 11 of which undergo a change in works council status. Sadly, but also perhaps not
so surprisingly given the relatively small number of changers in the data, the results do
not shed much additional light on the impact of works councils on productivity, or the
related hypotheses regarding their impact in unionized establishments and their
interaction with worker voice and information sharing arrangements. Although they are
estimated with great imprecision, both the column (4) and (5) results offer suggestive
evidence of a possible negative impact of works councils on productivity.12
In the random effects analysis, the impact of works councils is estimated based on
variation both across firms and over time, and, given the absence of numerous control
variables, there are no doubt significant determinants of total factor productivity which
are also correlated with works council status and for which we have failed to account,
thus producing possible bias in the estimated works council effect. Fixed effects
estimation eliminates some of this concern by focusing attention on the works council
impact estimated from within-firm changes in works council status over time, and thus
eliminates bias due to left-out time-invariant features of firms.
It is unclear what to expect, a priori, regarding the direction of the bias in the
random effects estimation. However, to the extent firms and workers choose their
works council status, it is arguably the case that those that adopt works councils are
typically forward-thinking with regard to general human resource practices. If these
other practices affect productivity positively, then we might expect the bias in the
random effects models to be positive—works council status is standing in for the
panoply of other, forward thinking human resource practices that have a positive
impact on productivity. And, indeed, there is suggestive evidence for this in the fixed
effects findings in Table 4.13
The regression discontinuity findings appear in Table 5. These results identify the
works council impact on productivity focusing on a different, much larger set of firms
as compared to the fixed effects specification. Column (1) gives the results of the
first-stage, instrumenting equation that relates the sorting cutoff criterion variable—
Workforce50—to works council status. It can be seen from these results that the legal
mandate positively and significantly affects the works council status of firms. In
addition, unions are more likely to exist in firms with works councils, as is
information sharing with employees.
12 Interestingly, despite much better measures of the capital input than found in the German literature, the
basic results in Table 4 are not significantly altered if the capital variable is omitted from the analysis.
Perhaps this is the case because our analysis is limited to single-establishment firms, wherein capital
intensity is typically both low and less variable.
13 Random effects estimation using the smaller, 218-observation panel data yield results that are very
similar to those in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4, except that the “employee decision making” variable
becomes statistically insignificant in the column (2) specification.
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The total factor productivity regression results, with the instrumented works
council variable, appear in columns (2) and (3). The most striking result from these
estimated equations is that works councils are found to be statistically significantly
and negatively related to firm productivity. This finding is hinted at in the fixed
effects results. Looking at the column (2) specification, we see that the estimated




Independent variable Works council TFP TFP




Workforce −1.4E-05 1.1E-04+ 1.1E-04+
(3.1E-05) (6.3E-05) (6.3E-05)
Workforce2 2.55E-09 −2.4E-08** −2.45E-08**
(4.9E-09) (9.9E-09) (9.9E-09)
Workforce3 −9.17E-14 6.3E-13** 6.49E-13*
(1.3E-13) (2.6E-13) (2.6E-13)
Union 0.209* −0.01 0.064
(0.019) (0.044) (0.087)
Employee Decision Making −0.006 0.083* 0.053
(0.017) (0.031) (0.050)








Time −0.005 0.114* 0.114*
(0.016) (0.026) (0.026)
Industry Controls √ √ √
Constant 0.064 −0.182** −0.149
(0.042) (0.088) (0.092)
Observations 1008 1008 1008
Standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%
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coefficients on the worker voice and information sharing variables are similar in
both magnitude and statistical significance to their effects on productivity in the
OLS random effects estimation results of Table 4, column (2): granting employees
certain decision making ability and sharing particular kinds of information with
them enhances productivity by 8% and 7%, respectively. The estimated union effect
on productivity, although still statistically insignificant, is unchanged in sign and
only slightly changed in magnitude as compared with the OLS random effects
results.
Unfortunately, once again the interactive specification results are not very
revealing. However, one might safely conclude from these findings that there is
little evidence of a positive boost to productivity from combining works councils
and unions. As with the interactive findings in Table 4, the impact of worker voice
and information sharing in non-works council settings are of a sizeable magnitude,
roughly half the quantitative impact in the non-interactive specification of column
(2) and virtually the equivalent of or greater than the impact observed when these
same human resource practices exist in works council settings. Adding to the latter
the quite large and statistically significantly negative impact of works councils on
productivity in settings where these human resource practices are absent, and, once
again, there is suggestive evidence that the informal existence of such practices
outside of formal works council structures might well provide a viable substitute to
works councils when it comes to human resource mechanisms for productivity
enhancement.
Finally, as a check on these results Table 6 gives the regression discontinuity
findings for the smaller, 30–70 workforce sample which narrowly straddles the
50-worker cutoff criterion. The results are estimated with less precision than in
the larger sample, and the quantitative magnitudes of the estimated impacts seem
less plausibly accurate, but the general conclusion stands—namely, that the works
councils are found to have a negative and statistically significant impact on firm
productivity. Interestingly, we find no evidence that voice or information-sharing
features affect firm productivity in the column (3) specification for this sample of
establishments. However, there is some slightly suggestive evidence in the column
(4) results that these characteristics interact with works council status in significant
ways—negatively, in the case of worker voice, and positively, in the case of
information sharing.
Conclusion
This paper presents the first empirical evidence of which we are aware on the impact
of works councils on firm productivity in France. The data are restricted to
observations on single establishment firms, and so the findings may well change
once data become available on the multi-establishment firm sector. That said, our
results offer no evidence that French works councils have a positive impact on firm
productivity. Indeed, in the regression discontinuity findings we see some evidence
that works councils have a negative impact on productivity. Moreover, our results
offer no support for a claim that the works council impact on productivity is superior
in unionized environments.
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Table 6 Regression discontinuity results for workforce 30–70 sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Random effects
Establishments with workforce 30–70









Workforce −0.323** −0.344 −0.399+
(1.5E-01) (2.4E-0) (2.3E-01)
Workforce2 0.007** 0.008 0.009+
(3.0E-03) (5.0E-03) (5.0E-03)
Workforce3 −4.80E-05* −5.3E-05 −6.0E-05+
(3.2E-03) (3.4E-05) (3.4E-05)
Union 0.263* 0.145 0.248**
(0.051) (0.100) (0.113)
Employee Decision Making −0.024 −0.026 0.009
(0.046) (0.045) (0.048)








Time −0.062 0.039 0.028
(0.041) (0.041) (0.040)
Industry Controls √ √ √
Constant 10.305* 5.076** 5.05 5.955+
(0.389) (2.253) (3.581) (3.520)
Observations 270 270 270 270
Standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%
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Perhaps the most interesting findings from our analysis are that worker voice and
information sharing human resource practices are widely utilized in French firms,
that this is true independent of works council status, and that these features are
positive, statistically significant and quantitatively important determinants of firm
productivity. Thus, one possible explanation for the lack of a positive impact of
works councils on firm productivity is that many of the features of works councils
that may serve to foster enhanced productivity are informally in existence and
relatively pervasive across French firms, independent of works council status.
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